My 1961 copy of Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary defines Kantianism thusly:
- Kant′i·an·ism (-iz’m)
- n. The philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). He held that the mind furnished the forms of experience and the sense organs furnish only impressions. Our knowledge is therefore only subjective. But Kant shows the necessity of a belief in God, freedom, and immortality, if we are to have the institutions of civilization. And he further shows that without the a priori idea of intelligent design in nature we could not recognize any phenomena of life in plants or animals or other organisms.
Now, it has been more than 6 years since read much Kant, and I shouldn’t be considered an expert in anything, so I’m not in much of a position to critique the accuracy of the content of that definition. Certainly, the first half is reasonable, and I seem to recall him saying some things in Der Einzig Mögliche Beweisgrund… that could be understood to mean something like the second half of the definition. I’d even be willing to say that the definition reflects a familiarity with Kantian philosophy about as well as any 5-sentence summary could hope to do. What bothers me is the “But.” Without that little conjunction (that fails, I might add, to conjoin anything), the definition would present a (possibly imbalanced) survey of major themes and ideas Kant dealt with, presumably what one might hope to find in a dictionary. But the “But” transforms the definition into an exegesis, or an editorial, or perhaps an apology of Kantian philosophy, which I would never hope to find in a dictionary.
A more recent (and concise) definition from our friend Webster may be found at dictionary.reference.com.
NP: Sinead O’Connor, Just Like U Said It Would B
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I think the “but” serves to bracket out the Critiques of Pure Reason, which seems to be wht the first half of the definition is about, and most arguably the most important of Kant’s thought, from his work of practical reason and judgement. Even Kant made the “editorializing” distinction, as I recall, when he distinguished the proper scope of pure reason from practical reason.
I couldn’t have written a better 5 sentences. But then I would have stopped at the end of the first sentence, not wanting to mislead people.
Comment by ben—September 4, 2003 @ 1:42 pm
You’re right, of course. It has been so long since I read the second Critique (and, I must shamefully admit, I have never read the third), that I had forgotten the entire dialectic second part. The first Critique established that knowledge of the supersensible (and hence, of the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and of God). In the second Critique he shows the necessity of belief in the face of that epistemic void for the efficacy of the faculty of pure practical reason. In other words, these dogmas of faith are assumptions, or postulates, required for a practical application of the pure reason. Kant writes (Beck translation): “Thus the highest good is practically possible only on the supposition of the immortality of the soul, and the latter, as inseparably bound to the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason. By a postulate of pure practical reason, I understand a theoretical proposition which is not as such demonstrable, but which is an inseparable corollary of an a priori unconditionally valid practical law.”
My concern was with the semantic rôle of the conjuction, and that I hardly expect to find exegesis in the dictionary. I seem to be wrong about the former; I still feel uneasy about the latter. For reference, here’s the entry on Nietzscheism (you knew this was coming):
The definitions for Platonism and Aristotelian are uninteresting, that of Freudian mentions dream interpretation but makes no mention of sex or instinct, and for Thomism it states:
Comment by Michael—September 4, 2003 @ 11:24 pm
Wonder whast St. Bonaventure would think of that definition?
You are right, these two definitions are wrong and misleading.
But perhaps they could have used the same definition for both thomism and nietzscheanism; viz, a philosophical argument against the Manichean heresy.
This would be more accurate, but more misleading, no?
Comment by Ben—September 5, 2003 @ 1:39 pm